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Abstract—In this paper, we present an end-to-end view of
IoT security and privacy and a case study. Our contribution
is three-fold. First, we present our end-to-end view of an IoT
system and this view can guide risk assessment and design of
an IoT system. We identify 10 basic IoT functionalities that
are related to security and privacy. Based on this view, we
systematically present security and privacy requirements in terms
of IoT system, software, networking and big data analytics in
the cloud. Second, using the end-to-end view of IoT security
and privacy, we present a vulnerability analysis of the Edimax
IP camera system. We are the first to exploit this system and
have identified various attacks that can fully control all the
cameras from the manufacturer. Our real-world experiments
demonstrate the effectiveness of the discovered attacks and
raise the alarms again for the IoT manufacturers. Third, such
vulnerabilities found in the exploit of Edimax cameras and our
previous exploit of Edimax smartplugs can lead to another wave
of Mirai attacks, which can be either botnets or worm attacks.
To systematically understand the damage of the Mirai malware,
we model propagation of the Mirai and use the simulations to
validate the modeling. The work in this paper raises the alarm
again for the IoT device manufacturers to better secure their
products in order to prevent malware attacks like Mirai.
I. INTRODUCTION
IoT can be defined as interconnecting various uniquely
addressable objects through communication protocols. IoT is
booming and changing our life. We can interconnect anything
including virtual objects together and access those things
remotely [1], [2]. IoT has broad applications, including health-
care, life sciences, municipal infrastructure, smart home, retail,
manufacturing, agriculture, education and automation. Forbes
reported that by 2020 annual revenue of IoT vendors could
exceed $470B, Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) will exceed
60 trillion in the next 15 years and IoT market size was
about 900M in 2015 [3]. According to Gartner’s hype cycle
of emerging technologies in 2016 [4], the expectation for IoT
is very high and standardization of IoT platforms will need
5-10 years. The IEEE P2413 Working Group has been trying
to standardize the IoT framework since 2014 while there is no
consensus yet [5] .
IoT has attracted hackers. There are two kinds of threats:
threats against IoT and threats from IoT. 1. Threats against
IoT: On Oct. 21, 2016, a huge DDoS attack was deployed
against Dyn DNS servers and shut down many web services
including Twitter [6]. Hackers exploited default passwords and
user names of webcams and other IoT devices, and installed
the Mirai botnet [7] on compromised IoT devices. The huge
botnet was then used to deploy the DDoS attack against Dyn
DNS servers. Various other IoT devices have been hacked.
IP cameras can be hacked through buffer overflow attacks
[8]. Philips Hue lightbulbs were hacked through its ZigBee
link protocol [9]. SQL injection attacks were effective against
Belkin IoT devices [10]. 2. Threats from IoT: Researchers
also find cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks that exploited the
Belkin WeMo app and access data and resources that the app
can access [10]. A IoT enabled UAV can fly far away and
compromise the security and privacy of people on ground.
In this paper, we focus on safeguarding IoT and present an
end-to-end view of IoT security and privacy. Our contribution
is three-fold. First, we present our end-to-end view of an IoT
system. We identify 10 basic IoT functionalities related to
security and privacy while an IoT system may not have all
these 10 functionalities. Based on this view, we systematically
analyze the security and privacy requirements in terms of five
dimensions: hardware, operating system/firmware, software,
networking and big data analytics in the cloud. Second, using
the end-to-end view of IoT security and privacy, we present
an attack against the Edimax IP camera system. We are the
first to exploit this system and have identified various attacks
that can fully control all Edimax cameras of the model of
interest. The exploit of the camera system demonstrates the
usefulness of our view of IoT security and privacy. Third,
the attacks against Edimax cameras and our previous attacks
against Edimax smartplugs [11] allow attackers to install the
Mirai malware onto those systems. To evaluate the damage of
the Mirai malware systematically, we model the prorogation
of the Mirai. The Mirai propagation is different from the
prorogation of traditional worms since it adopts a password
dictionary attack against target IoT devices. The dictionary
attack affects the prorogation speed. We use NS3 simulations
to validate the modeling. Our model also matches the real-
world data of Mirai.
A conference version of this paper is included in the
proceedings of IEEE GLOBECOM 2017 [12]. Compared with
the conference version, this journal version provides more
details of our end-to-end view of IoT security and privacy
in Section II-B, particularly on microcontrollers (MCUs). We
introduce more attacks against the IP camera in Section IV-D.
Mirai modeling is provided in Section V and simulation results
are presented in Section VI-B.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce
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our end-to-end view of IoT security and privacy in Section
II. In Section III, we introduce the communication protocol of
the Edimax camera system. Then we present our exploit of the
Edimax camera system in Section IV. The Mirai propagation
models are presented in Section V. We evaluate the exploit
and the propagation of Mirai and compare our model with real
world data in Section VI. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. FRAMEWORK OF IOT SECURITY AND PRIVACY
In this section, we first present our end-to-end view of an
IoT system and then present security and privacy requirements
for an IoT system.
A. End-to-End View of IoT
We will focus on a standalone IoT system as shown in
Figure 1. Such a system normally has three basic components:
thing, controller and cloud. The thing is connected to the
Internet. For a smart home system, the thing is normally
behind a wireless router, which adopts NAT to set up a local
network of home systems. The controller can be a program
on a PC or app on a smart device such as a smartphone or
tablet. Without loss of generality, we often use a smartphone as
an example controller in this paper. Within the local network,
the controller can communicate with the thing through the
router. However, if the controller is outside, it will not be
able to contact the thing directly since the thing is behind
NAT (unless port forwarding is enabled on the home router
for the thing). Therefore, most IoT systems use a cloud as an
intermediate relay between the thing and controller. The thing
builds a permanent connection to the cloud. The controller
controls or requests information from the thing through the
cloud.
Fig. 1. End-to-end View of IoT
We have identified 10 basic functionalities in a IoT system.
Please note an IoT system may not have all these 10 function-
alities because of its design goal and application.
1) Upgrading: The firmware of the thing can be upgraded
to provide more and better services or a security patch
can be applied. The firmware can be a full-fledged
embedded Linux system. If the thing is a microcontroller
(MCU), the firmware can be a piece of dedicated code
for simple control or sensing. For example, a MCU can
be used to turn on and off an air conditioner.
2) Pairing: Bootstrapping a thing generally involves two
steps, pairing and then binding. A controller like a smart-
phone should be able to communicate with a thing at the
bootstrapping time. Such a communication channel can
be WIFI, Bluetooth, ZigBee, barcode/scanner, and near
field communication. This connecting process is denoted
as pairing. For example, when many smart things on
market are powered on, they behave as a wireless router
and allow the controller to connect to the things in order
to configure the things. Apparently, if a thing is deployed
in public, we have to limit who can access the thing and
configure it.
3) Binding: This is the process of configuring the thing
through the controller once pairing is done. The con-
troller may bind the thing to the Internet, that is, connect
the thing to the Internet. For example, the controller
can require a user to input the WiFi SSID (Service Set
Identifier) and password of a wireless router and send
the information to the thing, which can then connect
to the Internet. Another important binding activity is to
bind the thing and its users. For example, the controller
can learn the identity of the thing (e.g., the MAC
address of the wireless interface on the thing) via the
communication channel used in the pairing process.
Therefore, the user and the thing can be bound together
via an appropriate protocol.
4) Local authentication: Within a local network, the con-
troller may connect to a port open on a thing, which
should authenticate the user and then allow further
actions from the user.
5) Local control: Once a user is authenticated, the con-
troller can send commands to control the thing.
6) Remote authentication. If the controller is on the
Internet and not in the local network, it may not be able
to directly contact the thing, which may be behind NAT,
and has to go through the cloud for authentication.
7) Remote control: If the controller is on the Internet and
not in the local network, it may have to control the thing
through a cloud.
8) Relay by cloud: For remote authentication and control,
the cloud is to relay the authentication and control
messages between the thing and controller. The cloud
may have an authentication server to authenticate both
the thing and controller and connect them together.
9) Big data analytics by cloud: The cloud may collect
the data from things and users, and perform big data
analytics. A cloud may connect to other clouds that serve
other things, share data and request further analytics
capabilities.
10) Sensing and notification: Many things are smart. For
example, a thing may sense the room temperature and
notify the user if the temperature is too low or high. A
thing can also notify the user about abnormal behaviors
such as too many login attempts on the thing.
2
B. Security and Privacy in IoT
To secure an IoT system, we have to consider five di-
mensions: hardware, operating system/firmware, software, net-
working and data generated and maintained within the system,
as shown in Figure 2. As illustrated in Figure 1, an IoT system
has quite a few components, all of which should be inspected
from these five aspects. The 10 functionalities of IoT identified
in Section II-A span across these five dimensions. We have to
secure any interface that may interact with users (including
attackers) in an IoT system.
Fig. 2. Five Aspects of IoT Security and Privacy
Hardware security: Hardware security is critical when
attackers can physically access the IoT devices. For example,
many IoT devices do not disable their debugging ports after the
testing and validation stage, which give attackers full access
to the internal firmware. In fact, almost all IoT devices have
hardware vulnerabilities which may be exploited by attackers
including the UART/JTAG debugging ports, multiple boot
options, and unencrypted flash memory [13]–[15]. Through the
hardware backdoors, attackers can easily bypass software level
integrity checking by either disabling the checking functional-
ity or booting the system through an injected firmware image.
An IoT security vulnerability database is recently constructed,
which presents a large spectrum of different types of vul-
nerabilities including hardware security related vulnerabilities
[16]. Accordingly, countermeasures are recently proposed to
prevent physical attacks such as runtime attestation to prevent
TOCTOU attacks [17]. TPM [18], TrustZone [19] and Intel
SGX [20] can provide hardware-level security.
Microcontrollers (MCUs) have been broadly used in indus-
try including automobiles and home automation. For example,
the Melzi board uses ATmega chips and is a very popular 3D
printer control board. We use one popular 8-bit microcontroller
ATmega1284P to demonstrate the security issues in MCUs.
ATmega1284P is a low-power CMOS 8-bit microcontroller
based on the AVR enhanced RISC architecture. It can run
instructions in a single clock cycle and achieves throughputs
around 1MIPS per MHz. ATmega1284P has 128KB in-system
programming (ISP) flash memory, 16KB SRAM, 4KB EEP-
ROM, 32 General Purpose Working Registers, two USARTs,
SPI serial port, and a JTAG (IEEE 1149.1 compliant) test
interface for on-chip debugging and programming. Fuse and
lock bits can be used to lock writing and reading to/from
the flash memory from either the application area or the
bootloader section through JTAG/SPI or other ports. These
bits can also lock writing and reading to/from the EEPROM
memory through JTAG/SPI or other ports. Programming the
fuse and lock bits will protect the content written to the on-chip
flash and EEPROM memory. Setting fuse bits can disable only
the JTAG/OCDEN/SPI ports and setting lock-bits can prevent
HVPP (High Voltage Parallel Programming).
Another threat against MCUs and integrated circuits is the
clock glitch attack. The processor and FPGA clock signals
are often used to synchronize various parts of the circuit. In a
clock glitch attack, the system clock frequency is intentionally
increased for a short period of time. The glitched clock may
disrupt CPU from correctly running instructions. When the
clock is back to normal, later instructions will be executed
correctly. A clock glitch generator for fault injection attacks
against an AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) circuit is
designed and implemented on the SAKURA-G board in [21].
The SAKURA-G board is also used to implement a biased
fault attack against a fault-resistant software implementation
of LED block cipher to retrieve its secret key [22] . A detailed
study is performed on the effects of clock glitches on legacy
8-bit AVR MCUs [23] . A glitchy-clock generator integrated
in FPGA is presented for evaluating fault injection attacks and
their countermeasures on cryptographic modules [24]. Clock-
glitch attacks are also deployed under the impact of heating
[25].
Operating system (OS)/firmware and software security
and privacy: Given the often limited functionalities of an
IoT device, a trustworthy operating system [26] can be imple-
mented on the device if the cost is permitted. The control app
for a thing is often installed on a smartphone and software
secure measures should be applied in order to prevent the
attack against the app like the attack in [10]. We can also
not blindly trust the cloud for security. For example, servers
installed on Amazon EC2 have to be secured by whoever
deploys the servers. Software security issues are similar to
those in the traditional computer systems. For example, back-
doors and public and private SSL key pairs are discovered
by performing static analysis on a large number of unpacked
firmwares [27]. Chen et al. [28] perform large-scale automated
dynamic analysis of various firmwares to discover potential
exploits using the Metasploit Framework. A case study of
a firmware modification attack is investigated in [29]. A
buffer overflow exploit is found by analyzing Home Network
Administration Protocol (HNAP) [30] so that it can be used to
execute any code on the device. A stack-based buffer overflow
of the general library, glibc [31], is exploited to attack several
home hubs [32].
A MCU often does not have a full-fledged operating system,
but a piece of dedicated code, i.e. firmware, for the partic-
ular application. The firmware has to be carefully designed
and implemented to prevent malicious manipulation of the
firmware. ATmega1284P’s flash memory space is divided into
two sections, application program section and boot loader
section. A boot loader is a piece of code that runs when
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the chip is powered-up or restarted. For ATmega1284P, the
boot loader can be designed to have three functions, load
firmware, boot firmware, and readback. A physical jumper is
used to put the boot loader into different functions. If an IoT
device uses ATmega1284P, the load firmware and readback
functions have to be secured in case that an attacker tries to
hook up an ISP cable and read the firmware to compromise
the intellectual property (IP). For example, readback requires a
password. ATmega1284P can store a crypto key in EEPROM.
Therefore, a secure firmware distribution can be implemented.
An encrypted firmware can be downloaded from the Internet.
The boot loader can read the key in EEPROM, decrypt the
encrypted firmware and write it into the flash.
Network Security and Privacy: An IoT system is a net-
worked system and the whole system has to be secured from
end to end [33]–[39]. Communication should be encrypted to
prevent the leak of sensitive information. Authentication has to
be carefully implemented. We have differentiated pairing from
binding. Recall that in the pairing process, the controller needs
to connect to the IoT device in order to configure the thing.
However, most IoT devices allow any controller in proximity
for pairing. The risk of such practice may be small in a private
setting like a home. However, for a large-scale deployment in
a public environment, anybody with access to the devices can
reconfigure the system and may break into the system. After
pairing, we run the binding process to bind identities to the
thing in order to control it. The authentication has to be set
up in a proper way. For example, weak passwords should be
avoided. An IoT system may be composed of a large number
of nodes with sensing capabilities and security techniques in
sensor networks can be applied accordingly [40]–[43].
Many manufacturers fail to provide necessary protection
for their networked IoT devices, which are under constant
attacks nowadays. The Mirai DDoS attack [7] was possible
because of the weak passwords on various IoT devices. Rouf
et al. [33] exploit the unsecured wireless communication
protocol of automatic meter reading. Dhanjani [34] hacks the
Phillips Hue lightbulb system and finds that the authentication
mechanisms are not strong. Molina [35] exploits the KNX, a
standardized home automation communication protocol, and
finds that the lack of authentication and encryption allows an
attacker to remotely control the appliances in a hotel. Rahman
et al. [36] find the communication protocol vulnerabilities
of the wearable device (Fitbit). By automatically analyzing
the applications and forging the authentication messages, Zuo
et al. [39] design an authentication message generator to
perform brute force attacks against the corresponding remote
application server. Obermaier and Hutle [38] investigate the
vulnerabilities of communication protocols of four surveillance
camera systems.
Big Data Analytics: Since the cloud sits between the con-
troller and IoT devices, it can collect all the data. Many of the
systems including Amazon AWS IoT are set up in this way. We
have to question: should the cloud know everything and collect
data about us and our belongings? For example, for remote
authentication, should the cloud serve as the authentication
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server to authenticate controllers/things? However, big data
collected by the cloud can help defeat attacks. For example, a
proper intrusion detection system over the cloud can prevent
another round of Mirai attack. Since things are often very
specific, intrusion detection can be made easy.
III. PROTOCOLS OF EDMIAX CAMERAS
In this section, we present a case study of exploiting an IP
camera system manufactured by Edimax under our view of IoT
security and privacy. We first introduce the architecture of the
camera system and then present the detailed communication
protocol.
A. Architecture of the Camera System
By traffic analysis, we find that the Edimax camera system
has three components, including the camera, controller, and
cloud servers as shown in Figure 3. If the controller and
camera are in the same local network, the controller can
communicate with the camera locally and fetch the live video
through a web server on the camera. In this paper, we
concentrate on remote attacks and will focus on remote com-
munication protocols of the camera system when the controller
and camera are not in the same local network. The camera
connects to the Internet through an ethernet cable or WiFi.
The controller can be an app on a smartphone. The controller
communicates with the camera via the cloud servers, including
the registration server and the command relay server. The
registration server is used for device registration for both the
controller and the camera. The command relay server forwards
command messages between them.
B. Paring, Binding and Registration
We first investigate the paring process. When the camera
is used for the first time, a user needs to connect it to her
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home network using an ethernet cable. The software EdiView
Finder Utility should be installed on a computer in the same
home network. This utility is used to search the home wireless
router and configure the camera to use the home wireless
router. At this point, the wired connection of the camera can
be disconnected.
In the binding process, we can change the password
and other configurations such as the resolution of the
image via a web page of the camera. The link is
http://host/setup.asp?r=20141126, where host is the local IP
address of the camera. Upon connecting to the Internet, the
camera registers with two remote servers, i.e., registration
server and command relay server. The controller also registers
with both servers.
The packets transmitted between the controller, camera, and
remote servers are obfuscated instead of encrypted. The right
shift is performed over all characters but the first character in
packets. The number of positions in the right shift is between
1 and 7, which is the difference between the first original
character and the corresponding obfuscated character. The first
original character is always “<”, since a pair of “<>” is used
to delimit key and value pairs. When the camera or controller
receives a packet, it compares the first character with “<” to
obtain the number of positions and perform the corresponding
left shit to obtain the plaintext.
At the registration phase, all the packets use UDP. The UDP
service ports of both the registration server and the command
relay server are 8760. Figure 4 illustrates the registration
procedure for both the camera and controller. Since the first
three steps of both the camera and controller are similar,
we take the camera as an example to present the detailed
procedure as follows.
STEP 1: In this step, the camera registers with the regis-
tration server. The camera first sends a UDP packet to the
registration server. The packet has a value of “1” in the
“opcode value” field, referred to as command value in this
paper, and a UUID (Universally Unique Identifier) in the
“id value” field. The UUID is used to uniquely identify the
connection.
Upon receiving the packet with the command value “1”
from the camera, the registration server responds with a UDP
packet with a command value “10”. The response packet
consists of the UUID received from the camera, and the IP
addresses and the ports of both the camera and the command
relay server. Consequently, the camera can learn the IP address
and port of command relay server from this response packet.
STEP 2: In this step, the camera registers with the command
relay server. The camera first sends a UDP packet to the
command relay server with a command value “1” and a new
UUID to uniquely identify this connection. The command
relay server responds with a UDP packet with a command
value “10”. The packet contains the UUID received from the
camera, and the IP addresses and the ports of both the camera
and the command relay server.
STEP 3: Once the camera receives response from the
command relay server, it sends a packet with a command value
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Fig. 5. Connection establishment phase and data communication phase
“2” back to the registration server. This packet contains a new
UUID. It is used to inform the registration server the fact that
it has registered with the command relay server.
STEP 4: The camera sends two successive UDP packets
to the UDP service port 8765 of the registration server. The
first packet with a code value of “3000” is used to inform the
registration server that the camera is online. The second packet
with a code value of “1010” carries the camera information
such as the camera model, MAC address, type, alias, LAN
IP address and port of this camera, serial number, camera
firmware version, and camera status.
After receiving the messages with the code value of “1010”
from the camera, the registration server responds with a UDP
packet with a code value of “1020”. The packet contains the
MAC address and the status of the camera. The camera repeats
STEP 1 to STEP 4 around every 20 minutes to inform the
registration server that the camera is online.
C. Camera Discovery Phase and Authentication
In the camera discovery phase, the controller tries to first
check the online status of the camera via the registration
server as shown in Figure 5 and then sends the authentication
information to it. The UDP service ports of the registration
server for the camera and the controller are 8765 and 8766,
respectively.
STEP 5: In this step, a user sets the configuration of the
controller in order to check the online state of a specified
camera. The user inputs an alias of the camera, the MAC
address of the specified camera, and the password through the
graphic user interface of the controller. The controller then
sends two successive UDP packets to the registration server.
The first packet with a code value of “3000” is to inform the
registration server that the controller wants to check the state
of the camera. The second packet with a code value of “2030”
contains the MAC address of the camera and the information
of the controller, including the LAN IP address and port, the
device firmware version, and a relay ID generated by the
controller. The relay ID is composed of the camera’s MAC
address and a timestamp. It is used in the data communication
phase to correctly interconnect the two TCP connections from
a pair of controller and camera on the command relay server.
After receiving the request from the controller, the registra-
tion server checks the camera status first. If the camera is
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offline, the registration server responds with a packet with
a code value of “5000”. Otherwise, the registration server
responds with a packet with a code value of “2040” to the
controller. This packet includes the IP addresses and ports
of both the camera and the command relay server, the relay
ID, camera firmware version, model, type, alias, and camera
status. The registration server also adds extra messages to the
“2030” packet and changes the code value to “2020”, and then
forwards it to the camera. The extra messages of “2020” packet
include the IP addresses and ports of the camera, the controller,
and the command relay server. Therefore, the camera can learn
the relay ID from this packet.
D. Remote Data Communication Phase
There are two ways for the controller to control the camera
remotely. First, the controller and the camera try to directly
communicate with each other using the UDP protocol. Second,
If the attempt of a direct UDP connection fails, the controller
and the camera will communicate with each other via the
command relay server using the TCP protocol. In this paper,
we mainly concentrate on the data communication using TCP.
STEP 6: To communicate with TCP, both the camera and
the controller establish TCP connections to the command
relay server. Recall that the camera and the controller obtain
the IP address and ports of the command relay server from
the registration server. The camera also obtains the relay ID
generated by the controller through the registration server.
Both the camera and the controller send a TCP packet that
contain the MAC address of the camera and the relay ID to
the command relay server. According to the MAC address
of camera and the relay ID, the command relay server can
interconnect these two TCP connections and relay the data
between the camera and the controller. However, the command
relay server does not send any response packets to neither the
camera nor the controller.
STEP 7: To obtain live images from the camera, the
controller sends requests to the camera via the command relay
server. The request packets contain a value of “/mobile.jpg”
in “url value” field, and authentication information in “auth
value” field. The authentication information in the format of
username:password is encoded in the Base64 scheme. The
default username and password are admin and 1234, respec-
tively. Users can change the password through the web page
of the camera. However, they cannot change the username as
it is hardcoded in the camera. Once the command relay server
receives the request packets from controller, it forwards them
to the camera.
STEP 8: After the camera receives the request, the camera
first checks the authentication information. If the authentica-
tion information is correct, the camera sends images back
to the command relay server, which forwards them to the
controller. Otherwise, the camera will send an authorization
failure packet to the controller.
Every time the controller tries to obtain an image, it needs
to send the request packet that contains the authentication
information. Therefore, the controller repeats the STEP 7 and
STEP 8 so as to continuously derive the live images taken by
the camera.
IV. SECURITY VULNERABILITIES OF EDIMAX CAMERAS
In this section, we first present three remote attacks against
the Edimax IP camera of interest: device scanning attack, brute
force attack, and device spoofing attack. Using these attacks,
we can remotely control any camera. We then present various
other attacks including local attacks. All the experiments were
conducted over our own purchased cameras.
A. Device Scanning Attack
The attacker can find out all online cameras by enumerating
all the possible MAC addresses. Recall the procedure of the
connection establishment phase. After the controller sends a
“2030” packet, the controller receives a “2040” packet if the
camera is online. If the camera is offline, the controller will
receive a packet with a code value of “5000”. Therefore,
the attacker can construct a “2030” packet with the specified
camera MAC address, and check whether the specified camera
is online according to the response packet.
The MAC address space of a manufacturer can be known
from the Internet. A MAC address contains 12 characters.
The first 6 characters indicate manufacturer and the other 6
characters indicate the namespace given to the manufacturer.
Products of the same model from a manufacturer are usually
assigned consecutive MAC addresses. Thus the attacker can
infer MAC addresses based on the MAC address of his own
purchased camera, enumerate the 12 characters of the MAC
address and can verify the state of the camera with each
potential MAC address.
B. Brute Force Attack
If a user changes the default password of a camera, the
attacker can find the password via a brute force attack. In
the data communication phase, when the controller sends a
TCP request that contains the authentication information, the
camera responds with images if the authentication information
is correct. Therefore, the attacker can enumerate all possible
passwords by repeating the TCP request, and determine if
the password is right or not in terms of the response packet.
Our experiments show that the command relay server does
not block this brute force attack. If a user chooses a 4-digit
password like the default one, the brute force attack works.
Although there is no explicit password policy from the
manufacturer, we find that the camera password can be 63
characters long, and allows digits, special characters, upper-
case, and lower-case alphabetic letters. Therefore, if the user
employs a long and complicate password, the brute force
attack may not work.
C. Device Spoofing Attack
The device spoofing attack can obtain a camera password
of any length and combination. In the device spoofing attack,
the attacker creates a software bot implementing the camera
communication protocol in order to emulate the camera. When
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the user opens the control app, the TCP request packet with
the password is sent to the attacker’s software bot. Therefore,
the attacker obtains the password.
The detailed attack process is presented as follows.
1) The attacker chooses an online camera that uses a non-
default password based on the device scanning results
and creates the software bot with the specific MAC
address. Any camera from this manufacturer can be
spoofed this way.
2) The software bot registers with the registration server
and the command relay server by performing STEP 1 to
STEP 4. The software bot sends two UDP packets with
the command value of “1” and “2” to both registration
server and command relay server for registration. It then
sends two successive UDP packets (i.e., code value of
“3000” and code value of “1010”) to the registration
server informing the server that the spoofed camera is
online. Once the software bot receives the packet with
the code value of “1020” from the registration server, the
attacker knows that the spoofed camera is online. The
software bot repeats STEP 1 to STEP 4 as many times
as possible, since the real camera will register itself by
performing STEP 1 to STEP 4.
3) When the user opens the control app, the app sends
two successive UDP packets (i.e., code value of “3000”
and code value of “2030”) to the registration server as
introduced in STEP 5. The registration server forwards
the packets to the software bot spoofing the camera. Si-
multaneously, the registration server informs the control
app that the camera is online.
4) The control app builds a TCP connection to the com-
mand relay server and sends a TCP request to the server
automatically. The command relay server forwards the
TCP request that contains the authentication informa-
tion to the software bot. Recall that the authentication
information is encoded with the Base64 scheme and
the format is username:password. As a result, it is
trivial for the attacker to derive the password from the
authentication information.
5) The spoofed camera should be offline as soon as it
obtains the authentication information. Recall that the
real camera registers with the registration server and the
command relay server every 20 minutes. Accordingly, it
takes at most 20 minutes for the real camera to get online
again after the spoofed camera obtains the authentication
information. After that, the user can see the images
and videos taken by real camera again and may not
realize that the camera has been compromised. Once
the attacker obtains the password, she can fully control
the camera.
D. Other Attacks
We can perform various local attacks. 1. If the attacker can
physically access the camera, she can click the reset button and
perform the pairing using her own computer. Once pairing is
done, she can bind the camera, e.g., changing the password
of the camera. In this way, the attacker can fully control the
camera. 2. If the controller and the camera are located in the
same local network, the controller can directly access the live
video via the web service provided by the camera. Their com-
municating traffic is in plaintext. Therefore, a local attacker
can trivially obtain the password when the user accesses the
live video. 3. An attacker can install a malicious firmware into
the camera via the link “http://host/setup.asp?r=20141126”. In
this way, the attacker can add various malicious software in
the victim camera system and they can establish a reverse shell
to a remote server so as to remotely execute commands in the
camera as root.
We have also discovered a hidden backdoor vulnerability
by using IDA Pro to manually reverse-engineer the CGI
(Common Gateway Interface) scripts in the camera Linux
operating system. There is a CGI script “telnetd.cgi” that can
be used to start a telnet service. If an attacker is in the local
network, she can start the telnet service by access the URL link
http://host/camera-cgi/private/telnetd.cgi?action=start, where
host is the local IP address of the camera and action=start
is a pair of value and attribute passed to the CGI script.
Authentication is required to start the telnet daemon while
using the URL link. We can use the camera username and
password obtained through various attacks, e.g., the device
spoofing attack. Then the attacker can use the telnet username
and password, “admin” and “1234”, to log into the camera OS.
Note that the username and password of the telnet service are
not the ones used for accessing the live video from the camera,
and cannot be changed by altering the password of the camera.
We can even remotely start the telnet service using the CGI
script. Recall that a request used to obtain a live image from
the camera contains a “url value” field in STEP 7. After we
obtain the password of the camera via the device spoofing
attack, we can send a request that contains a value of “/camera-
cgi/private/telnetd.cgi?action=start” in the “url value” field to
remotely start the telnet service. If a camera is deployed in
a public network instead of behind a NAT router, we can
remotely log into the camera system.
V. SECURITY THREATS FROM MIRAI
We have introduced the attacks against Edimax cameras in
Section IV. If those Edimax cameras use public IPs, we can
install any malware including Mirai onto them. We have also
showed that Edimax smart plugs suffer from device spoofing
attacks [11]. Edimax smart plugs also suffer from a command
injection attack in its password updating procedure and allow
an adversary to run local commands such as tftp. Therefore
an adversary can combine the device spoofing attack and
command injection attack to download the Mirai malware and
install it even if Edimax smart plugs are behind a wireless
router. We have installed Mirai on our purchased smart plus
this way. Given the IoT vulnerabilities discovered by us and
other researchers, another wave of Mirai attack may affect us
all in the foreseeable future.
In this section, we present our analysis of the released
source code of the Mirai malware [7] and explore the botnet
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Fig. 6. Propagation process of Mirai
architecture and propagation. The propagation model is studied
in detail. The goal is to understand the impact of Mirai.
A. Mirai Botnet
The Mirai botnet consists of four components as shown
in Figure 6: bots, a C&C (command and control) server, a
ScanListen server, and loader servers. The bots are the IoT
devices that are compromised by the Mirai malware and can
continue to infect vulnerable devices by scanning the port
of the Telnet service and deploying a password dictionary
attack. The username/password list is hard-coded in the Mirai
malware. The bots receive commands from a botmaster so
as to conduct various attacks including distributed deny-of-
service (DDoS) attacks. The C&C server monitors the botnet
status and the botmaster controls the bots via the C&C server,
e.g., sending attack commands. The ScanListen server receives
information from newly discovered vulnerable IoT devices and
forwards the information to the loader server. The loader server
logs into a vulnerable device and infects it by executing the
Mirai malware fetched from the loader server. The IoT devices
can be divided into three categories: (1) IoT devices that close
the Telnet service port, i.e., 23/2323 port. The bots never get
a chance to establish TCP connections with these devices;
(2) IoT devices that open the Telnet service port but their
username/password is not in the username/password list of
Mirai. The bots can perform the brute force attack but cannot
compromise them; (3) IoT devices that open the Telnet service
port and their username/password is in the list of Mirai. These
devices can be compromised.
Figure 6 illustrates the propagation procedure of Mirai. The
detailed procedure is presented as follows.
• Step 1 - Scanning: The scanning starts with a single IP,
which is treated as a bot for consistence. The bot scans
and discovers vulnerable IoT devices over the Internet.
The bot performs TCP SYN scans to probe the 23/2323
port of the public IP addresses. Mirai white-lists some IP
addresses including those of the US Postal Service, the
Department of Defense, the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA), and IP ranges belonging to Hewlett-
Packard and General Electric. Upon obtaining a TCP
SYN/ACK packet from an IoT device, the bot builds a
TCP connection with the IP address of the device and
then randomly chooses a pair of username/password from
its dictionary in an attempt to log into the Telnet server
and executes commands to check whether the login is
successful. By default, the dictionary has 62 pairs of
username/passwords. However, the bot only tries at most
10 times on against a target.
• Step 2 - Bots reporting to ScanListen server: When
a bot compromises a vulnerable IoT device, it reports
the information of the device to the ScanListen server,
including the IP address, port, and username/password
of the target. The domain name and port of ScanListen
server are also hard coded into the malware.
• Step 3 - Information relay from ScanListen server
to loader server: Once receiving the information of a
compromised IoT device from the bot, the ScanListen
server forwards the information of the device to the loader
server.
• Step 4 - Loader server installing Mirai: The loader
server builds a TCP connection with the compromised
device and logins with the received username/password.
After successfully logging into the device, it first checks if
a file transmission tool like wget or tftp is installed on the
target system. If so, it downloads the Mirai malware from
the loader server and execute the malware. Otherwise, the
loader server connects to the telnet port of the target,
reads a tiny binary file whose function is similar to
the function of wget, and writes echo into the telnet
connection. The string for echo is the hex characters
from the binary file and the output stream of echo is
redirected into a file, which will be saved at the target
device. Therefore, the binary file is transmitted from the
loader server to the target as shown in Listing 1, and
will be used to download the Mirai malware from the
loader server. As soon as the Mirai is executed, it shuts
down Telnet, SSH, and HTTP server on the compromised
device to prevent other malwares or administrators from
login. Mirai also binds on port 48101 to ensure only one
instance of the malware is running on this device.
Listing 1. Loader server echoes a binary file into the target device
# d e f i n e FN DROPPER ‘ ‘ upnp ” .
# d e f i n e TOKEN QUERY ‘ ‘ / b i n / busybox ECCHI ” .
# Othe r code . . .
u t i l s o c k p r i n t f ( conn−>fd ,
‘ ‘ echo −ne ’%s ’ %s ”FN DROPPER ” ; ‘ ‘TOKEN QUERY‘ ‘\ r\n ” ,
conn−>bin−>h e x p a y l o a d s [ conn−>e c h o l o a d p o s ] ,
( conn−>e c h o l o a d p o s == 0) ? ‘‘>” : ‘ ‘>>”);
• Step 5 - Bot registration with C&C server: Once the
Mirai malware is executed on a vulnerable device, the
device establishes a TCP connection, registers with the
C&C server and becomes a member of the Mirai botnet.
The domain name and port of the C&C server are hard
coded into the malware. Then the bot executes Step 1.
• Step 6 - Botmaster commanding: A botmaster can send
commands to the bots. The botmaster instructs the bots
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to launch an attack via C&C server. Mirai is capable
for multiple attacks, such as UDP DoS attack, TCP DoS
attack, HTTP attack, and GREP attack.
• Step 7 - Botnet attacking: The bots receive commands
and start attack. Upon receiving the attack instruction
from the C&C server, the bots launch an attack on a
target.
B. Scanning Strategy
We analyze released source code of the Mirai to study its
scanning algorithm that is the key to the propagation speed.
By analyzing the Mirai scanning algorithm in Algorithm 1,
we find that Mirai malware uses a uniform scanning strategy.
Specifically, Mirai randomly scans public IP addresses and
randomly selects a pair of username/password from a hard-
coded list for the dictionary attack. It uses the TCP SYN
scanning technique to probe the 23/2323 port of a device to
determine if the port is open. According to the Mirai source
code, the bot first randomly selects 160 target IP addresses
and uses a raw socket to send TCP SYN packets to these
destinations.Then it checks the raw socket 160 times in order
to receive SYN+ACK packets.
Once a SYN+ACK packet is received, it builds a TCP
connection with the IP address in the non-blocking mode
and records the connection in a table. After checking and
building connections using the raw socket 160 times, the bot
checks the status of all TCP connections in the table. If a TCP
connection is not established within 5 seconds, the bot gives
up the connection request.
If the TCP connection to the telnet port of an IP is
established successfully, the bot randomly tries a pair of
username/password selected from a hardcoded list and also
checks whether the device login is successful through the
feedback from the target device. During this procedure, if the
bot does not get any response from the device in 30 seconds,
the bot will tear down this connection and establish a new TCP
connection to guess a random username/password again. Mirai
tries to crack the username/password of a target IP address up
to 10 times.
C. Mirai Propagation Model
According to the Mirai scanning strategy, we establish a
Mirai propagation model to analyze the propagation speed.
Unlike the malwares such as Code Red worm [44] that exploit
software vulnerabilities, the Mirai malware not only scan the
devices to discover the open 23/2323 port but also crack
the username/password using a hardcoded dictionary so as to
successfully infect IoT devices. We denote q as the probability
that a bot successfully finds the right pair of username/pass-
word. Since there are 62 pairs of username/password in the
dictionary by default and the bot tries at most 10 times on a
target, we can derive q = [1 − (61/62)10]. Denote Ω as the
total number of IP addresses, N as the number of vulnerable
IoT devices, and µ as the average scan rate of the bot. I(t)
is the number of bots at time t. At the start t = 0, there are
I(0) bot(s) and [N−I(0)] vulnerable devices. At time t, some
vulnerable devices are discovered and infected, and we have
I(t) bots and [N − I(t)] vulnerable devices. During a small
time interval τ , a bot can send τµ scans in total. The number
of vulnerable IP addresses hit by the bot is τµΩ [N − I(t)].
Therefore, we can derive the number of compromised device
during the time interval τ by
κ =
τµ
Ω
[N − I(t)]q. (1)
The number of new bots created during the period between t
and t+ τ is κI(t). Then we can obtain the number of bots at
time t+ τ by
I(t+ τ) = I(t) + κI(t). (2)
Taking τ → 0 , we can have the Mirai propagation model by
dI(t)
d(t)
=
µ
Ω
[N − I(t)]I(t)q (3)
Note that κ in Equation (1) is affected by various factors,
e.g., network congestion. κ can decreases as the number
of bots increases. Large-scare worm propagation may cause
network congestion. It results in the reduction of the infec-
tion rate. Therefore, we change the number of compromised
devices by a bot as follows:
κ(t) =
τµ
Ω
[N − I(t)][1− β I(t)
N
]αq, (4)
where β is the ratio of the number of vulnerable devices
over the number of devices with 23/2323 port open. Recall
that the bots will try the dictionary attacks against devices
that open 23/2323 port while the telnet passwords are not in
the dictionary. Such attacks generate traffic that contribute to
the network congestion. α is used to adjust the infection rate
sensitivity to the number of compromised devices. Then we
can revise the propagation model of Equation (3) by
dI(t)
d(t)
=
µ
Ω
[N − I(t)][1− β I(t)
N
]αI(t)q. (5)
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we present our experiment results validating
the three attacks against Edimax IP cameras. All the attacks
were performed over our own purchased cameras. In addition,
we perform extensive simulations using NS3 [45] to evaluate
the propagation speed of the original Mirai scanning strategy
in an ideal setup and also compare our theoretical modeling
with real-world network telescope monitoring.
A. Attack against Edimax IP Cameras
To verify the feasibility of the device scanning attack, we
first put our Edimax IP camera online. We then send a packet
with a code value of “2030” to the Edimax registration server
and receive a packet with a code value of “2040”. We then
put the camera offline. We resend a packet with a code value
of “2030” to the registration server and receive a packet with
a code value of “5000”. Therefore, we can scan any potential
MAC address to determine if the corresponding camera is
online or not.
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Algorithm 1 Mirai Scanning Algorithm
Require:
(a) µ - the number of SYN probes sent by Mirai each
time,
(b) m - the size of a table,
(c) table - TCP connection table,
(d) table[i] - store the ith TCP socket in table,
(e) table[i].state - TCP connection state of the ith entry
of table, e.g., connecting or connected.
Ensure: Discover the vulnerable devices
1: while TRUE do
2: if time interval since last SYN probe >= 1s then
3: Send µ probes using a raw socket
4: end if
5: while TRUE do
6: Read SYN+ACKs packets from the raw socket
7: if error || no data for reading || no entries in table
then
8: break
9: else if the ith entry of table is empty then
10: Build a connection, table[i].state = connecting
11: end if
12: end while
13: for i = 1 : m do
14: if the connection in table[i] times out then
15: if table[i].state == connected then
16: re-connect(try times < 10), otherwise free
table[i]
17: else if table[i].state == connecting then
18: free table[i]
19: end if
20: else if table[i].state == connecting then
21: Set the table[i] in write file descriptor set (wr fdset)
22: else if table[i].state == connected then
23: Set the table[i] in read file descriptor set (rd fdset)
24: end if
25: end for
26: Select the write and read file descriptors
27: for i = 1 : m do
28: if table[i] in wr fdset then
29: if connection error for table[i] then
30: free table[i]
31: else if connection success for table[i] then
32: table[i].state = connected
33: end if
34: end if
35: if table[i] in rd fdset then
36: while TRUE do
37: if connection error for table[i] then
38: re-connect(try times < 10), otherwise free
table[i]
39: break
40: else if no data for reading then
41: break
42: else if data for the last command then
43: if login success then
44: report to ScanListen server
45: else if login fail then
46: re-connect(try times < 10), otherwise free
table[i]
47: end if
48: else
49: send one command
50: end if
51: end while
52: end if
53: end for
54: end while
2
To verify the brute force attack, we set a random 4-digit
password for our own camera. We then run the brute force
attack and can identify the right password in a few minutes.
We now present the results of evaluating the device spoofing
attack. The device spoofing attack may fail if the real camera
registers with the registration server and this kicks our spoofed
camera offline. In such a scenario, the controller will connect
to the real camera, and the spoofed camera cannot receive
the request packet with the authentication information from
the controller. However, our software bot spoofing the camera
can send out the registration packet continuously in order
to increase the attack success rate. To verify our attack, we
connect the real camera to the Internet, and the spoofed camera
registers with the registration server every 10 seconds. A user
opens the controller randomly during the attack. If the spoofed
camera receives the authentication information, the attack
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Fig. 7. Network topology used in the simulation experiment
succeeds; otherwise, it fails. We perform the experiments for
50 times and the spoofed camera receives the authentication
information 49 times.The success rate of the device spoofing
attack is up to 98%.
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B. Mirai Propagation
We simulate the Mirai original propagation model using
NS3. Recall that we divide the devices in the IP address
space into three categories. According to the results shown
in ZoomEye [46], 11.1% online hosts have port 23 or 2323
open. Shodan [47] shows that 17.6% of Telnet servers (23
port or 2323 port) use default credentials. Therefore, in our
simulations, we assume 10% of IoT devices in the IP space
open port 23 and 20% of the devices with the Telnet service
are vulnerable. Assume the total number of devices in our
simulated network is 65536. By using Monte Carlo method,
we select 6325 (9.6% of the total IP space) devices that open
port 23 and 1270 (20.1% of the Telnet servers) devices can be
compromised by Mirai malware. Initially, there is one Mirai
bot. Figure 7 illustrates the network topology used in the
simulation experiment. We use the NS3 global routing by
building a global routing database for the topology using a
Dijkstra Shortest Path First (SPF) algorithm. In addition, we
set the throughput of devices and routers as 1000Mbps. The
original Mirai scanning strategy is implemented in terms of
Algorithm 1. We repeat the simulation 100 times and derive
the average number of bots I(t) at time t.
Figure 8 shows the relationship between I(t) and t in
Equation (3) and Equation (5) as well as the simulation results.
It can be observed from Figure 8 that the theoretical curve
obtained by Equation (5) matches the curve from the NS3
simulation result better. It demonstrates that κ can be affected
by network congestion as the number of compromised devices
increases. NS3 simulation results show that 99% of vulnerable
devices can be compromised within 31 seconds. According
to the theoretical curve obtained from Equation (5), 99% of
vulnerable devices have be compromised within 34 seconds.
So the theoretical result and simulation result are very close.
To understand the impact of the number of username/-
password attempts on the Mirai propagation speed, we have
performed simulations when the number of attempts is 5, 15,
20, 25 and 30 respectively. A pair of username/password is
randomly chosen from its dictionary of 62 pairs of username/-
password every time. Once a correct username/password is
selected, a bot will stop the attempt. We repeat the simulation
10 times and derive the average number of bots I(t) at time
t. Figure 9 shows that as the number of attempts rises thus
q in Equation (5) increases, the propagation speed increases.
Another observation is as the number of attempts increases,
the gain (acceleration) of the propagation speed decreases.
This can be caused by the extra generated traffic due to the
increasing number of attempts (which will slow down the bot
scanning rate) and congestion.
C. Comparison between Real-world Monitoring and Theoret-
ical Modelling of Mirai Propagation
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our model, we also
compare the results from our theoretical model of Equation
(5) with the real-world network telescope results from Figure
4 in [7]. Although there are data jitters in the practical curve
in [7], the critical points in these two curves match well as
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Fig. 8. Simulation and theoretical results using the original Mirai propagation
strategy
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Fig. 9. The Mirai propagation speed using different password cracking times
shown in Figure 10. As we can see from the results in [7],
the number of vulnerable devices is around 110,000 during the
first wave of Mirai attack. In our theoretical model in Equation
(5), we set N , Ω, µ, β, and α as 110,000, 3,417,112,576, 27,
0.2, and 3, respectively. Recall that α is used to adjust the
infection rate that is affected by the number of compromised
devices and thus congestion as a classical paper [44] on worm
propagation shows. The scanning rate µ used in our model
is 27 packets per second. Since the size of a TCP SYN
scanning packet is 74 bytes, the scanning bandwidth is 1998
Bps. The scanning rate is reasonable according to the results
from Figure 6 in [7]. The long-time Mirai prorogation curve
in [7] is complicated because of the intrusion response effort
from network administrators and various variants of Mirai
introduced later.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first present our view of an IoT system
that includes the thing, cloud and controller from an end-to-
end perspective. 10 basic functionalities have been identified
for such a system. Those functionalities have to be secured
properly according to our risk analysis of different components
of the IoT system. We then present our exploit of an IP camera
system and discovered three attacks including device scanning
attack, brute force attack and device spoofing attack that can
fully control all of the IP cameras from the manufacturer.
We performed real-world experiments to validate the attacks
and find that the device spoofing attack can obtain a user’s
password at a probability of 98% whatever the password is.
Our end-to-end view of IoT Security and privacy can serve
as the guide to design a secure and privacy preserving IoT
system. The exploits of Edimax cameras in this paper and
the exploits of Edimax smart plugs in our previous work
allow the Mirai malware to be installed on those devices. To
understand the potential impact of future Mirai attacks, we
systematically model the propagation of Mirai. Our model and
NS3 simulations match the trend of the Mirai propagation in
real world.
Our work in this paper raises the alarm again for the IoT
device manufacturers to better secure their products. The end-
to-end view of IoT security and privacy can guide the effort
of designing and protecting IoT systems.
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